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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

“AUDIT THE FED” FROM AN AUSTRIAN PERSPECTIVE:
FINANCIAL REFORM THROUGH AN UNHOLY COALITION OF
UNWITTING MISESIANS

INTRODUCTION
I asked [Richard] Posner why the Fed’s errors constitute a failure of
capitalism. He said the central bank was part of the “capitalist structure,” along
with property rights and a judicial system to enforce them. To the extent that
the Fed mismanaged the money supply (or interest rates) and failed to assure
“a reasonable degree of economic stability,” it has to be regarded as a failure
1
of capitalism.

It tends to carry credence when Judge Richard Posner, one of the most
cited legal scholars in American history,2 chalks up the 2008 financial crisis to
“a failure of capitalism.”3 And, as demonstrated by the above quotation, Judge
Posner seems to gloss over any particular role played by the Federal Reserve
(the Fed) by labeling the central bank as merely part of a “capitalist structure.”
In contrast to Posner’s metatheoretical approach in analyzing America’s
economic woes, this Comment takes a more modest approach by focusing on
the Fed not as a part of a system of capitalism, socialism, or some other
economic system, but as simply a creature of legislation.4 Indeed, the Federal
Reserve Act establishes a congressionally chartered central bank5 with a
presidentially appointed board of governors6 and a dual mandate of maximum
1. Caroline Baum, Capitalism Still Has Legs That Are Long and Sexy, BLOOMBERG (April
30, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aHEie5ri2clo&refer=
home.
2. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 424 (2000).
3. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT
INTO DEPRESSION (2009); See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST
DEMOCRACY (2010).
4. For a comprehensive account on the political nature of the origins of the Federal
Reserve, see MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, A HISTORY OF MONEY AND BANKING IN THE UNITED
STATES: THE COLONIAL ERA TO WORLD WAR II 183–259 (2002). “The financial elites of this
country, notably the Morgan, Rockefeller, and Kuhn, Loeb interests, were responsible for putting
through the Federal Reserve System, as a governmentally created and sanctioned cartel device to
enable the nation’s banks to inflate the money supply in a coordinated fashion, without suffering
quick retribution from depositors or noteholders demanding cash.” Id. at 258.
5. Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 226 (2006).
6. 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2006) (“The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System . . .
shall be composed of seven members, to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate . . . .”).
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employment and price stabilization.7 Accordingly, as a modest first step
towards effective financial reform, this Comment proposes amending the
Federal Reserve Act to provide for a full audit. Doing so would provide
accountability to both policymakers and the public at large, putting a “political
check” on the Fed operations that bring about and prolong economic crises.
Part I provides some brief background information on the current “audit
the Fed” movement and introduces the Federal Reserve Transparency Act
legislation currently being considered in the House of Representatives. Part II
looks at recent efforts by Bloomberg, L.P., through Freedom of Information
Act litigation and Congress through a provision in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act to partially enhance Fed transparency.
While limited in scope, the information gathered from these transparency
measures sheds light on the type of information one might expect, at least
partially, from a full audit. Part III considers some theoretical models for
understanding the roles the Fed plays in both bringing about and managing
economic crises. The most important of these theoretical models is Austrian
Business Cycle Theory, which explains how the central bank, through credit
expansion, creates “boom and bust” cycles in the economy. This section
further examines other economic concepts that are relevant to understanding
why certain political movements are well suited to join a coalition to demand a
Fed audit. Part IV shows how Austrian Business Cycle Theory explains the
2008 financial crisis and the ensuing Great Recession. Part V looks at two
prominent American political movements—Occupy Wall Street and the Tea
Party. Both of these movements have platforms that would be conducive not
only to demanding a Fed audit, but also providing a political check on Fed
credit expansion. By pursuing economic and ideological interests that are
unrelated to Austrian Business Cycle Theory, these two groups can form what
may seem to be at first blush an unlikely alliance that keeps Fed-induced
business cycles in check. In appealing to both the Occupy and Tea Party
movements, an audit of the Fed might prove to be an easier fix than addressing
what Judge Posner diagnosed as the failure of an entire economic system.
I. BACKGROUND
House Bill 459, the Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2012, with a
purpose “[t]o require a full audit of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and the Federal reserve banks by the Comptroller General of

7. 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2006) (“The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and
the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit
aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase production, so as to
promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term
interest rates.”).
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the United States,”8 passed the House of Representatives on July 25, 2012.9
The bill, which had at least 274 co-sponsors and passed 327 to 98 with
bipartisan support, was described as “a coup for its chief sponsor, Rep. Ron
Paul (R-Tex.), a longtime nemesis of the Fed.”10 Indeed, Ron Paul had been
introducing “audit the Fed” bills in Congress for a decade.11
Although House Bill 459 eventually died after passing the House,
Representative Paul’s influence spreading the “audit the Fed” message
continued into his 2012 presidential campaign. During the campaign,
Republican nominee Mitt Romney showed some support for an audit of the
Federal Reserve.12 Accordingly, “[u]nder pressure from anti-tax Tea Party
activists and other small government advocates,”13 the Republican Party
included a plank in its platform calling for an annual Fed audit:
[T]he Republican Party will work to advance substantive legislation that brings
transparency and accountability to the Federal Reserve, the Federal Open
Market Committee, and the Fed’s dealings with foreign central banks. The first
step to increasing transparency and accountability is through an annual audit of
the Federal Reserve’s activities. Such an audit would need to be carefully
implemented so that the Federal Reserve remains insulated from political
pressures and so its decisions are based on sound economic principles and
sound money rather than on political pressures for easy money and loose
14
credit.

Notwithstanding this plank in the Republican platform, Mitt Romney devoted
little time to this issue in his losing presidential bid.
However, if the wind has been knocked from the sails of the “audit the
Fed” movement, it may only be temporarily. According to Rasmussen, roughly

8. Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2012, H.R. 459, 112th Cong. (2012).
9. Id.
10. Ed O’Keefe, ‘Audit the Fed’ bill passes in the House with bipartisan support, THE
WASHINGTON POST (July 25, 2012, 3:19 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/
post/audit-the-fed-bill-set-for-house-vote/2012/07/24/gJQAJypU7W_blog.html. For Ron Paul’s
arguments against the Fed, see RON PAUL, END THE FED (2009).
11. Chris Moody, Ron Paul’s ‘Audit the Fed’ bill passes the House, ABC NEWS (July 25,
2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/ron-pauls-audit-fed-bill-passes-house/story?id=168
55319#.UO0IwW-CniU.
12. Lisa Lerer & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Romney Calls for Fed Audit as Party Mulls
Platform Plank, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 20, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201208-20/romney-calls-for-fed-audit-as-party-mulls-platform-plank.html. (“‘The Federal Reserve
should be accountable,’ Romney told thousands of voters at a campaign rally today in Goffstown,
New Hampshire. ‘We should see what they’re doing.’”).
13. Id.
14. COMMITTEE ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE 2012 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION,
2012 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 4 (2012).
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seventy-five percent of Americans favor auditing the Federal Reserve.15
Accordingly, at the beginning of the 2013 legislative session, Representative
Paul Broun (R-GA), with a stated plan “to pick up right where Congressman
Paul left off,” filed “audit the Fed” legislation identical to that of the retired Dr.
Paul.16 House Bill 24, the proposed Federal Reserve Transparency Act of
2013, would “require a full audit of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and the Federal reserve banks by the Comptroller General of
the United States.”17 More importantly, the audit would occur within twelve
months “[n]otwithstanding section 714 of title 31, United States Code, or any
other provision of law.”18 Indeed, House Bill 24 would go so as far as to repeal
the following exceptions on audits of the Federal Reserve under current law:19
(1) transactions for or with a foreign central bank, government of a foreign
country, or nonprivate international financing organization;
(2) deliberations, decisions, or actions on monetary policy matters, including
discount window operations, reserves of member banks, securities credit,
interest on deposits, and open market operations;
(3) transactions made under the direction of the Federal Open Market
Committee; or
(4) a part of a discussion or communication among or between members of the
Board and officers and employees of the Federal Reserve System related to
20
clauses (1)-(3) of this subsection.

Most notably, a Fed audit under House Bill 24 would be more thorough than
any audit under current law, including monetary policy decisions, agreements
with foreign central banks and governments, and Federal Open Market
Committee transactions.21 If the results of recent efforts to partially enhance
Fed transparency, described in Part II, are any indication of the type of
information one can expect to learn from a full audit, one can expect full
ammunition for those seeking public accountability and a political check on
Fed operations.
II. CURRENT FED TRANSPARENCY
To advocate for a full audit of the Federal Reserve is not to say that current
law provides for no Fed transparency. Under 31 U.S.C. § 714, the Comptroller
15. 75% Favor Auditing The Fed, RASMUSSEN REPORTS (July 29, 2009), http://www.rasmus
senreports.com/public_content/business/general_business/july_2009/75_favor_auditing_the_fed/.
16. Ginger Gibson, Broun wants to audit the Fed, POLITICO (Jan. 4, 2013, 3:35 PM),
http://www.politico.com/blogs/on-congress/2013/01/broun-wants-to-audit-the-fed-153390.html.
17. Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 24, 113th Cong. (2013).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 31 U.S.C. § 714 (2006).
21. H.R. 24.
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General may audit several monetary and finance agencies, including the
Federal Reserve Board and Federal Reserve banks.22 However, 31 U.S.C. §
714(b) specifically excludes the following from these audits:
(1) transactions for or with a foreign central bank, government of a foreign
country, or nonprivate international financing organization;
(2) deliberations, decisions, or actions on monetary policy matters, including
discount window operations, reserves of member banks, securities credit,
interest on deposits, and open market operations;
(3) transactions made under the direction of the Federal Open Market
Committee; or
(4) a part of a discussion or communication among or between members of the
Board and officers and employees of the Federal Reserve System related to
23
clauses (1)-(3) of this subsection.

These exclusions mean that Fed audits under current law are not very thorough
and, most importantly, do not include monetary policy decisions, agreements
with foreign central banks and governments, and Federal Open Market
Committee transactions. Important information, however, regarding Fed action
during the economic crisis has been obtained in other ways: most notably,
through litigation by Bloomberg, L.P., and an “audit the Fed” provision in the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The
Bloomberg litigation will be discussed next, followed by the Dodd-Frank
provision.
A.

Bloomberg FOIA Litigation

In 2008, media corporation Bloomberg, L.P. submitted Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) requests to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors
(the Board) seeking details about loans made to private banks at the Discount
Window and pursuant to emergency lending programs in April and May
2008.24 Bloomberg asked for the name of the borrowing bank, the amount of
the loan, the origination and maturity dates, and the collateral given for each
loan.25 The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
rejected the Board’s claims that this information was exempt from FOIA
disclosure and that a request to the Board did not constitute a request for
information held by the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks.26 The Board,
joined by a group of banks, appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for

22. 31 U.S.C. § 714.
23. Id.
24. Bloomberg, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 601 F.3d 143, 145 (2d
Cir. 2010).
25. Id. at 145–46.
26. Id. at 146.
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the Second Circuit, arguing for exemption under Exemption Four of the FOIA,
which allows a federal agency to refuse disclosure of “trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential.”27
In order to qualify under Exemption Four: “(1) The information for which
exemption is sought must be a trade secret or commercial or financial in
character; (2) it must be obtained from a person; and (3) it must be privileged
or confidential.”28 Noting the narrow compass of FOIA exemptions and the
preference for disclosure, the court held that the information at issue—the
identity of the borrowing bank, the dollar amount of the loans, the loan
origination and maturity dates, and the collateral securing the loan—was not
“obtained from” the borrowing banks within the meaning of the exemption.29
The court noted that while “[a] completed loan application will ordinarily
contain considerable information, and when it is submitted to a lender, the
lender has ‘obtained’ that information from the applicant,” “[t]he information
requested by Bloomberg was generated within a Federal Reserve Bank upon its
decision to grant a loan.”30 This information did not come into existence until a
Federal Reserve Bank made the decision to approve the loan request.31
Furthermore, even if the court were to consider the information as
“obtained from” the Federal Reserve Banks themselves, as “persons,” the
information still was not “privileged or confidential” within the meaning of
Exemption Four.32 Information is only “confidential” for the purposes of
Exemption Four when disclosure would cause substantial harm to the
competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained.33
The court rejected the Fed’s argument that the exemption applied to the Fed’s
program “to furnish critical infusions to distressed banks on a confidential
basis.”34 Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment in favor of Bloomberg.35

27. Id. at 146–47; 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
28. Bloomberg, 601 F.3d at 147 (citing Nadler v. FDIC, 92 F.3d 93, 95 (2d Cir. 1996)).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 148.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 149–50.
33. Bloomberg, 601 F.3d at 150.
34. Id. “The Fed . . . argued that revealing borrower details would create a stigma —
investors and counterparties would shun firms that used the central bank as lender of last resort —
and that needy institutions would be reluctant to borrow in the next crisis.” Bob Ivry, Bradley
Keoun, & Phil Kuntz, Secret Fed Loans Gave Banks $13 Billion Undisclosed to Congress,
BLOOMBERG (Nov 27, 2011, 6:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-28/secret-fedloans-undisclosed-to-congress-gave-banks-13-billion-in-income.html.
35. Bloomberg, 601 F.3d at 151.
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As a result of the FOIA action, Bloomberg obtained 29,000 pages of Fed
documents detailing 21,000 transactions.36 The Fed committed $7.77 trillion as
of March 2009 to rescuing the financial system, including $13 billion in secret
Fed loans undisclosed to Congress, providing what Bloomberg called “[a]
fresh narrative of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009.”37 According to
Bloomberg, “[D]etails suggest[ed] taxpayers paid a price beyond dollars as the
secret funding helped preserve a broken status quo and enabled the biggest
banks to grow even bigger.”38 The data showed that the six biggest U.S.
banks—JPMorgan, Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs,
and Morgan Stanley—borrowed as much as $460 billion from the Fed and
accounted for sixty-three percent of the average daily debt to the Fed by all
publicly traded “U.S. banks, money managers and investment-services
firms.”39
B.

Dodd-Frank Audit

In June 2010, members of a House-Senate conference committee reached a
compromise to allow expanded audits of the Federal Reserve40 under the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.41 Language
from the Senate version of the bill granted the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) authority to audit the Fed’s emergency lending programs and
release details about the firms that benefited from those programs.42 The
compromise broadened these audits to include the discount window and its
purchases and sales of government securities, requiring the Fed to disclose
details about such transactions within two years after they occur.43 Ultimately,
section 1109 of the Dodd-Frank Act included the following GAO audit of the
Federal Reserve:
Notwithstanding section 714(b) of title 31, United States Code, or any other
provision of law, the Comptroller General of the United States . . . shall
conduct a one-time audit of all loans and other financial assistance provided
during the period beginning on December 1, 2007 and ending on the date of
enactment of this Act by the Board of Governors or a Federal reserve bank
under the Asset–Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund

36. Ivry, Keoun, & Kuntz, supra note 34.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Brady Dennis, Lawmakers agree to expand audit of Federal Reserve, The Washington
Post (June 17, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/16/AR20
10061605541.html.
41. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 1109, 124 Stat. 1376, 2127 (2010).
42. Dennis, supra note 40.
43. Id.
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Liquidity Facility, the Term Asset–Backed Securities Loan Facility, the
Primary Dealer Credit Facility, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, the
Term Securities Lending Facility, the Term Auction Facility, Maiden Lane,
Maiden Lane II, Maiden Lane III, the agency Mortgage–Backed Securities
program, foreign currency liquidity swap lines, and any other program created
as a result of section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (as so designated by this
44
title).

As a result of the Dodd-Frank audit, the GAO detailed how the Fed
provided $16 trillion in secret loans to bailout American and foreign banks
during the financial crisis.45 The GAO also recommended that the Fed
strengthen policies that deal with conflicts of interest,46 citing, for example:
Our review of several recommendations for waivers granted from September
19, 2008, through March 31, 2010, indicated that FRBNY employees who
requested waivers were generally allowed to continue to retain their related
personal financial investments. Most of the financial interests were in
institutions receiving emergency assistance, including AIG, Bank of America,
Citigroup, General Electric Company (GE), and JPMC. For example, on
September 19, 2008—3 days after the Federal Reserve Board authorized
FRBNY to assist AIG—the then-FRBNY President granted, under authority
delegated by the FRBNY Board of Directors, a waiver to a senior management
official with financial interests in AIG and GE who was involved in decision
47
making related to these two companies.

Furthermore, the GAO found that the Fed lacked a comprehensive policy to
manage risks related to vendor conflicts of interest.48 This was despite the fact
that the Fed awarded 103 contracts worth $659.4 million to help carry out its
emergency lending activities, with a few contracts accounting for most of the
spending.49 The GAO suggested that the Fed could benefit from stronger
guidance for these contracts.50 Indeed, “the highest-value contracts were
awarded noncompetitively due to exigent circumstances. The Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (FRBNY) awarded almost two-thirds of its contracts
noncompetitively, which accounted for seventy-nine percent of all vendor
compensation.”51 Additionally, in dealing with risk-management, the Fed
failed to track potential exposures in adverse economic scenarios and its
procedures lacked specific guidance on how regional Federal Reserve Banks

44. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1109.
45. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-696, OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO
STRENGTHEN POLICIES AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE 131 (2011).
46. Id. at 65.
47. Id. at 70.
48. Id. at 73.
49. Id. at 52.
50. GAO-11-696, supra note 45, at 52.
51. Id. at 57.
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should exercise discretion relating to high-risk borrowers.52 Lastly, the GAO
found that the Fed lacked “guidance and documentation” in its treatment of
eligible relief program participants.53
Recent Fed transparency brought about by Bloomberg and Dodd-Frank
sheds light on the Fed’s conduct in the wake of the 2008 crisis. These limited
steps can be complemented by political advocacy groups demanding a full
audit, as discussed in Part V. However, mere data concerning the vast quantity
of Fed bailouts is not meaningful without the economic framework provided in
Part III.
III. THE FED AND ECONOMIC CRISES: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The model that most clearly explains the role the Fed plays in economic
crises is Austrian Business Cycle Theory, discussed in Section A below. It
explains how the central bank, through credit expansion, creates “boom and
bust” cycles in the economy. Section B will discuss the concept of “moral
hazard,” a theory which helps explain how the Fed, through its bailouts and
easy money practices, can encourage risky behavior by economic actors. Two
final concepts—the redistributionary effects of inflation (Section C) and
inflationary government financing (Section D)—are relevant to analyzing how
advocacy groups, such as Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party, can play a
role in promoting Fed accountability.
A.

Austrian Business Cycle Theory

Theories of the business cycle seek to explain why, during the onset of a
recession or depression, members of the business community suddenly and
simultaneously experience a massive “cluster” of severe losses,54 or what
Lionel Robbins called a “cluster of errors.”55 In other words, “[w]hy should the
leaders of businesses in the various industries producing producers’ goods
make errors of judgment at the same time and in the same direction?”56
In his 1912 book, The Theory of Money and Credit,57 Ludwig von Mises
developed what would later be called Austrian Business Cycle Theory.58
52. Id. at 82.
53. Id. at 117.
54. Murray N. Rothbard, Economic Depressions: Their Cause and Cure (1969), in THE
AUSTRIAN THEORY OF THE TRADE CYCLE AND OTHER ESSAYS 65, 72 (Richard M. Ebeling ed.,
1996).
55. LIONEL ROBBINS, THE GREAT DEPRESSION 31 (1971).
56. Id.
57. LUDWIG VON MISES, A THEORY OF MONEY AND CREDIT (new ed., H.E. Batson trans.,
1953).
58. Roger G. Garrison, Introduction: The Austrian Theory in Perspective, in THE AUSTRIAN
THEORY OF THE TRADE CYCLE, supra note 54, at 7, 8. The Austrian School of economics refers
not to the economics of the country of Austria, but derives its name from the nationality of some
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Mises’s student, F.A. Hayek, won the 1974 Nobel Prize in economics for his
work expanding on the Misesian theory.59 Under the Austrian theory, a
business cycle begins when the central bank expands its liabilities through
credit creation.60 This action increases the cash reserves of commercial banks,
which expand credit and, thus, increase the nation’s money supply.61 This
credit expansion, in turn, lowers interest rates below what they would
otherwise be in a free market.62 This is because, in a free market, interest rates
are determined by the aggregate of individual time-preferences.63 Because a
loan is an exchange of a “present good” for a “future good,” and people prefer
current goods to future goods, the interest rate is the premium commanded on
the market on “money now” over “money in the future,” varying according to
the degree of people’s time-preferences.64 People’s time-preferences also play
another important role in Austrian Business Cycle Theory—determining to
what extent people will save and invest versus how much they will consume.65
Lower time-preferences, i.e., people are consuming less and saving and
investing more, mean lower interest rates.66 This is generally how economic
growth comes about—falling time-preferences lead to increased saving and
investment, as well as lower interest rates.67
The trouble occurs when interest rates fall not because of lower timepreferences and higher savings, but from the artificial expansion of bank
credit.68 This is because businesses react as if interest rates had fallen due to
genuine savings: businesses invest more in capital and producers’ goods.69
Lengthy and time-consuming projects that, before the fall in interest rates,
of its early and prominent practitioners, such as Carl Menger, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Ludwig
von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, etc. For a history of the Austrian school of economics, see EUGEN
MARIA SCHULAK & HERBERT UNTERKÖFLER, THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS: A
HISTORY OF ITS IDEAS, AMBASSADORS, & INSTITUTIONS (Arlene Oost-Zinner trans., 2011).
59. Murray N. Rothbard, Hayek and the Nobel Prize, THE LIBERTARIAN FORUM, October,
1974, at 7. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (1933);
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (1931).
60. Rothbard, supra note 54, at 81. One could cite endless sources explaining Austrian
Business Cycle Theory. Rothbard presents one of the most clear, concise expositions. See also
MISES, A THEORY OF MONEY AND CREDIT, supra note 57, at 261–366; LUDWIG VON MISES,
HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 535–83, 787–94 (The Scholar’s Ed., 1998);
MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE WITH POWER AND MARKET 989–1023
(2d ed., Scholar’s Ed., 2009).
61. Rothbard, supra note 54, at 81.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 81–82.
64. Id. at 82.
65. Id.
66. Rothbard, supra note 54, at 82.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 82–83.
69. Id. at 83.
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previously looked unprofitable, now seem profitable.70 Eventually, this money
gets paid out in higher rents to land and higher wages to workers in the capital
goods industries, bidding up labor costs in a manner that, for businesses, seems
sustainable under the current artificial interest rate.71 However, the problem
occurs when workers and landlords begin to spend this new money.72 Because
people’s time-preferences have not actually lowered—i.e., they do not actually
want to save more—workers consume most of this new income, redirecting
spending back to consumer goods industries.73 People do not save and invest
enough to buy the newly-produced capital goods, leading to sudden sharp and
continuing depression in the producers’ goods industries.74 At this point, it
becomes evident that businesses, due to the artificially low interest rates, have
misinvested the limited savings available—overinvesting in capital goods and
underinvesting in consumer goods.75 In his treatise, Human Action, Mises
makes a famous analogy to a master-builder to demonstrate the Austrian theory
of the business cycle:
The whole entrepreneurial class is, as it were, in the position of a master
builder whose task it is to erect a building out of a limited supply of building
materials. If this man overestimates the quantity of the available supply, he
drafts a plan for the execution of which the means at his disposal are not
sufficient. He oversizes the groundwork and the foundations and only
discovers later in the progress of the construction that he lacks the material
needed for the completion of the structure. It is obvious that our master
builder’s fault was not overinvestment, but an inappropriate employment of the
76
means at his disposal.

In short, “[t]he inflationary boom thus leads to distortions of the pricing
and production system.”77 Because prices in the capital goods industries had
been bid up too high to be profitable once the consumers reasserted their actual
time-preferences, these prices need to fall until proper market relations can be
resumed.78 Thus, according to Austrian Business Cycle Theory, a “depression”
is a painful but necessary phase by which the market economy liquidates the
malinvestments of the artificial boom, reestablishing consumer preferences for
consumption and investment.79 Inflationary booms can last for years until

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Rothbard, supra note 54, at 83.
Id. at 83–84.
Id. at 84.
Id.
Id.
MISES, supra note 60, at 557.
Rothbard, supra note 54, at 84.
Id. at 84–85.
Id. at 85.
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credit expansion finally stops—due to either bank instability or the prospect of
publically intolerable price inflation—and the inevitable adjustment occurs.80
Hence, Austrian Business Cycle Theory explains “[t]he repeated and
recurrent nature of the cycle, the massive cluster of entrepreneurial error, [and]
the far greater intensity of the boom and bust in the producers’ goods
industries.”81 If, then, the business cycle is to be blamed on inflationary bank
credit expansion by the central bank, the Austrian framework would suggest
that the central bank stop expanding credit in order to minimize the adjustment
that must occur.82 This also means that, during the onset of a recession, the
central bank should not try to “prop up” the current structure of business, i.e.,
bailouts, so as not to impede real recovery.83 Furthermore, even if a central
bank was able to “re-inflate” into another boom, they would just be setting up
for a larger bust in the future.84 Therefore, under an Austrian framework, in
order to foster recovery once a recession hits, the best thing a central bank can
do is “absolutely nothing.”85
B.

Moral Hazard

Moral hazard exists in “actions of economic agents . . . to the detriment of
others in situations where [the economic agents] do not bear the full
consequences . . . of their actions.”86 It creates an incentive for one person to
use more resources than he otherwise would, believing that someone else will
pay for it.87 In other words, moral hazard may be said to provide a “temptation
to steal” or “temptation to act irresponsibly.”88 A moral hazard problem exists
where one actor has the possibility to use another actor’s resources against his
will and acts accordingly.89
Government monetary intervention is moral hazard writ large, setting forth
the following chain of situations in which moral hazard is present.90 The
80. Id. at 85–86.
81. Id. at 86.
82. Rothbard, supra note 54, at 86–87. Austrian economics is a positive, not a normative
science. This means that, qua Austrian economics, it offers no policy prescriptions to economic
woes, but simply tells us the economic consequences of a given policy. Thus, it is important to
emphasize that this is a policy suggestion drawn from using an Austrian framework, given the
goal of a healthy economy. For explanations of Austrian epistemology and methodology, see
MISES, supra note 60, at 11–142; ROTHBARD, supra note 60, at 1–77.
83. Rothbard, supra note 54, at 87.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Jörg Guido Hülsmann, The Political Economy of Moral Hazard, 1 POLITICKÁ
EKONOMIE 35, 35 (2006) (citation omitted).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 43.
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intervention that provides the basis for this large-scale moral hazard is the
imposition of legal tender.91 In the United States, this means the Congressional
imposition of Federal Reserve notes as legal tender. Under this system, paper
money printed by government or the central bank, known as “fiat” paper
money, does not compete with other monetary products.92 This system of fiat
paper money creates moral hazard for the monopolistic producer of money,
i.e., the Federal Reserve, due to the “possibility to create ex nihilo virtually any
amount of money and, thus, to buy virtually any amount of good and services
for sale,” with the only limit being the potential for hyperinflation.93 But more
importantly, fiat paper money creates moral hazard for the users of money,
which includes citizens, governments, and, most importantly for the purposes
of this Comment, banks.94
[T]hey sooner or later come to realize that the masters of the printing press
have the power to bail out virtually any bankrupt firm or government. Thus
they engage in more or less reckless financial planning, expecting that the
monetary authorities will not allow a great mass of reckless planners to go
bankrupt. This speculation has been borne out by the last thirty years. Public
95
and private debts are at record heights all over the world.

Hence, the money producers are encouraged to continue to print, while the
money users are encouraged to engage in reckless financial planning.
Monetary theorists, aware of these dangers, have pointed out the necessity of
avoiding impressions by the central bank that it would bail out the market
participants.96
As outlined above, this scenario inevitably leads to financial bubbles as
more or less every market participant is subject to moral hazard, basing their

91. Hülsmann, supra note 86, at 43.
92. Id.
93. Id. Hyperinflation occurs when the public realizes that the government or central bank
will continue to inflate and, therefore, prices will continue to rise. In response, the public
purchases more goods because, in the future, the value of the monetary unit will be lower and the
price of goods higher. As the social demand for money decreases, prices increase more rapidly
than the increase in the money supply. With rising prices comes complaints of a “scarcity of
money” and greater efforts of inflation, causing even more accelerated price increases. When this
happens, the public begins a “flight from money,” investing in real goods in order to hold value
for the future. This lowers the demand for money to practically zero, causing prices to “rise
upward in astronomical proportions” as “[t]he value of the monetary unit falls practically to
zero.” Hyperinflation reaches a “runaway” stage when “[t]he main desideratum becomes getting
hold of real goods, whatever they may be, and spending money as soon as received.” At this
point, “the economy in effect breaks down, the market is virtually ended, and society reverts to a
state of virtual barter and complete impoverishment.” ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE,
supra note 60, at 1019–21.
94. Hülsmann, supra note 86, at 44.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Id.
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plans on the availability of more resources than are actually available in the
economy.97 Thus, “paper money by virtue of its mere existence produces
massive error on a large scale, until the bubble bursts in a crisis.”98
However, besides setting forth business cycles and creating moral hazard,
inflation—or “the process of issuing money beyond any increase in the stock
of specie”99—creates further concerns that are relevant to analyzing the role
political groups can play in the “audit the Fed” movement. This is because
inflation has a regressive redistributionary effect, as explained in Section C,
and can be used to finance government operations, discussed in Section D.
C. Redistributionary Effects of Inflation
When the central bank issues new money, or credit, it has a diffusion
effect—“the first receivers of the new money gain the most, the next gain
slightly less, etc., until the midpoint is reached, and then each receiver loses
more and more as he waits for the new money.”100 This is because, for those
who first receive the money, prices remain the same while, for later receivers,
prices have been bid up by the newly created money.101 Thus, credit expansion
has the redistributionary effect of raising prices as the money supply increases,
with the inflators, and those selling to them, benefitting at the expense of those
who later receive the money.102 Writes Rothbard:
This is the charm of inflation—for the beneficiaries—and the reason why it has
become so popular, particularly since modern banking processes have
camouflaged its significance for those losers who are far removed from the
banking operations. The gains of the inflators are visible and dramatic; the
103
losses to the others hidden and unseen, but just as effective for all that.

The above process describes the “short-run,” or “one-shot,” gains and losses
from inflation.104
Inflation also creates permanent gains and losses.105 Each individual will
react and alter spending patterns differently in response to his gains and
losses.106 Furthermore, new money forms “a high ratio to the existing cash
balances of some and a low ratio to that of others,” resulting in “a variety of
changes in spending patterns.”107 Thus, prices do not increase uniformly, and
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
ROTHBARD, supra note 60, at 990.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 991.
Id.
ROTHBARD, supra note 60, at 992.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the purchasing power of money falls disproportionally.108 Because some prices
rise more than others, some people permanently gain, while some permanently
lose.109 Rothbard describes some of the notable “losers” in the inflation
process:
Particularly hard hit by an inflation, of course, are the relatively “fixed”
income groups, who end their losses only after a long period or not at all.
Pensioners and annuitants who have contracted for a fixed money income are
examples of permanent as well as short-run losers. Life insurance benefits are
permanently slashed. Conservative anti-inflationists’ complaints about “the
widows and orphans” have often been ridiculed, but they are no laughing
matter nevertheless. For it is precisely the widows and orphans who bear a
main part of the brunt of inflation. Also suffering losses are creditors who have
already extended their loans and find it too late to charge a purchasing-power
110
premium on their interest rates.

With the redistributionary effect of inflation in mind, it becomes significant
that, according to the Consumer Price Index, the purchasing power of the U.S.
dollar has decreased by over ninety-five percent since the inception of the
Federal Reserve in 1913.111 It is in this way that the inflationary policies of a
central bank can be viewed as levying a regressive “inflation tax” for the
government, discussed in Section D below.
D, Inflationary Government Financing
Mises differentiates “simple” inflation from credit expansion, which, as
described above, sets forth the business cycle.112 In the former instance,
“political and institutional convenience” causes a government to borrow from
the central bank, which provides funds by issuing bank notes or crediting the
government’s deposit account.113 This transaction amounts to fiat money
creation, or inflation, as the new money filters into the market through
government spending.114 For example, the United States used this method to
fund its involvement in World War II, borrowing money from commercial
banks.115 Thus, this method of borrowing allows the government to finance
operations through inflation, rather than taxation. In light of the

108. Id.
109. ROTHBARD, supra note 60, at 992.
110. Id. at 992–93.
111. Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Purchasing Power of the Consumer
Dollar, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, (June 9, 2013, 1:33 PM), http://research.stlouis
fed.org/fred2/series/CUUR0000SA0R.
112. MISES, supra note 60, at 568.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

632

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:617

redistributionary effects of inflation, discussed in Section C above, this method
of government financing amounts to a regressive “inflation tax.”
IV. THE FED AND THE 2008 CRISIS
A.

The Housing Bubble

The events surrounding the recent “Great Recession” have sparked a
renewal of interest in Austrian Business Cycle Theory.116 Several high profile
investment advisers and financial commentators, inspired by the failure of
mainstream macroeconomists to foresee or explain the subprime mortgage
crisis and corresponding financial meltdown, have employed the theory in their
interpretation and analysis.117 Indeed, interest in the theory has been reinforced
by a number of economists, journalists, and politicians associated with the
Austrian school who warned of the emerging housing bubble.118 Austrian
economist, Joseph Salerno, demonstrates how the Great Recession serves as a
textbook example of Austrian Business Cycle Theory.119
Reacting to the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000 and corresponding
recession in early 2001, the Federal Reserve immediately and aggressively
lowered the target Federal Funds rate and reversed a decline in monetary
growth.120 This expansionary monetary policy was further spurred by the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.121 From 2001 to the end of 2005, the

116. Joseph T. Salerno, A Reformulation of Austrian Business Cycle Theory in Light of the
Financial Crisis, 15 Q. J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 3, 4 (2012), available at http://mises.org/journals/
qjae/pdf/qjae15_1_1.pdf.
117. Id.
118. Id. For popular examples of prominent Austrian predictions, see, e.g., Treasury’s Policy
on Housing GSE’s: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and
Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. 47–48
(2002) (statement of Rep. Ron Paul, Member, H. Comm. on Financial Services). “[D]espite the
long-term damage to the economy inflicted by the government’s interference in the housing
market, the government’s policy of diverting capital to other uses creates a short-term boom in
housing. Like all artificially created bubbles, the boom in housing prices cannot last forever.
When housing prices fall, homeowners will experience difficulty as their equity is wiped out.
Furthermore, the holders of the mortgage debt will also have a loss. These losses will be greater
than they would have otherwise been had government policy not actively encouraged overinvestment in housing.” Id. at 48; Jdouche, Peter Schiff Was Right 2006–2007 (2nd Edition),
YOUTUBE (Nov. 2, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2I0QN-FYkpw. (a compilation of
financial analyst Peter Schiff warning of the housing bubble on cable news outlets, at some points
being mocked by pundits). For a comprehensive list of Austrian predictions (with links), see
Walter Block, Austrian Thymologists Who Predicted the Housing Bubble, LEWROCKWELL.COM
(Dec. 22, 2010), http://www.lewrockwell.com/block/block168.html.
119. Salerno, supra note 116, at 7.
120. Id. at 24.
121. Id.
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Fed’s MZM122 monetary aggregate increased by about $1 billon per week and
the M2123 aggregate by about $750 million per week, while the monetary base
increased by about $200 billion, a cumulative increase of 33.3%.124
The Federal Funds rate was driven down below 2 percent and held there for
almost three years, pegged at 1 percent for a year . . . . The result was that the
real interest rate, as measured by the difference between the Federal Funds rate
and headline CPI, was negative from roughly 2003 to 2005. Rates on 30-year
conventional mortgages fell sharply from over 7 percent in 2002 to a low of
5.25 percent in 2003 and, aside from brief upticks in 2003 and again in 2004,
fluctuated between 5.5 percent and 6.0 percent until late 2005 . . . . Perhaps,
more significantly, 1-year ARM rates plummeted from a high of 7.17 percent
in 2000 to a low of 3.74 percent in 2003, rising to 4.1 percent in 2004 and to
125
slightly over 5 percent in 2005.

Simultaneous with this expansionary monetary policy, credit standards were
loosened while unconventional (subprime) mortgages became increasingly
popular.126 The result was a rapid expansion of mortgage lending, with the
subprime share of home mortgages outstanding rising from 8.62% in 2000 to
13.51% in 2005.127 Housing prices accelerated to double-digit annual
increases.128 Writes Salerno: “The housing boom soon turned into a bubble as
expectations lost contact with fundamentals and propelled housing prices
upward at accelerating rates.”129
By 2003, the credit-induced bubble hit corporate profits, and stock prices
began a steep ascent into 2007.130 This, combined with the aforementioned
increase in real estate prices, led to a $23 trillion increase in household net
worth from 2003 to 2006, driving the ratio of household net worth to annual
GDP to over 450% (an increase of 100 percentage points in a matter of three
years).131 Salerno describes the effect of the housing bubble on the individual
household:

122. Money with zero maturity.
123. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Current FAQs: What is the
money supply? Is it important?, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_128
45.htm (“M2 is defined as M1 plus savings deposits, small-denomination time deposits . . . and
retail money market mutual fund shares,” where “M1 is defined as the sum of currency held by
the public and transaction deposits at depository institutions.”).
124. Salerno, supra note 116, at 24.
125. Id. at 25–26.
126. Id. at 26. These unconventional mortgages included interest-only, negative equity, and
no-down-payment mortgages. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Salerno, supra note 116, at 26.
130. Id. at 28.
131. Id. at 29.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

634

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:617

This enormous increase in net worth was based almost solely on paper profits
and phantom capital gains on households’ real estate and financial assets.
Misled by their inflation-bloated balance sheets, households were induced to
“cash out” some of their home equity and increase expenditures on consumer
goods and services. In the expression of the day, people began “using their
homes as ATM machines.” Households financed their increased spending on
boats, luxury autos, upscale restaurant meals, pricey vacations etc., through
fixed-dollar debt. The increase in value of home equity and 401(k) plans also
reduced saving out of current income, and the personal saving rate plunged
from over 4 percent immediately after the recession of 2001 to less than 1
132
percent during 2005 . . . .

Thus, from 2003 to 2007, household assets rose by $21,743.3 trillion while
liabilities, consisting mostly of home mortgages and consumer credit,
increased by $4,500.8 trillion. As a result, the year-over-year rate of growth of
household debt nearly doubled, reaching eleven percent for three consecutive
years.133
Alas, all artificial credit-induced booms inevitably lead to a bust: in 2007,
housing prices, corporate profits, and the stock market plunged as “[t]he capital
gains accumulated since the mid-1990s were revealed to be an illusion.”134
During 2008, household net worth declined by $13 trillion, or twenty
percent—a sum that exceeded the annual GDP of Germany, Japan, and the
U.K. combined.135 “This,” writes Salerno, “brought the overconsumption
frenzy, which had spanned two inflationary booms, to a screeching halt.”136
Real retail sales and food services, which had plateaued at an annual rate of
$180 billion during 2006 and 2007, declined precipitously to $160 billion in
less than a year and remained stagnant for a year. Concurrently, firms in the
retail sector shed over 1 million workers from their payrolls with employment
dropping from a high of 15.56 million in December 2007 to a low of 14.36
million in December of 2009. On a year-over-year basis, retail employment
shrank by 5 percent for more than half of 2009. The S&P Retail Stock Index
(RLX) lost over half of its value between February 2007 and November 2009,
falling from 533 to 223. Indeed, the fall in the RLX was as sharp and deep as
137
the fall of the S&P 500.

The Wilshire 5000 Total Market Index, which tracks the total dollar value of
all U.S. headquartered equity securities, is a good proxy for capital
accumulation in the United States.138 From 2007 to 2009, the index collapsed

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
Salerno, supra note 116, at 32.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 35–36.
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from $15.5 trillion to $8 trillion, fluctuating around $12 trillion in 2012.139 The
index first reached $12 trillion in 1999, implying that there has been no net
capital accumulation since that time: “The capital that has been accumulated
since then has either been consumed or wasted in misdirected investments.”140
But it may happen that even the current level of wealth and income is based on
false calculations, because the Fed has used every tool at its disposal and has
even forged new ones in order to prop up housing and financial asset prices.
The weak and tenuous recovery that the U.S. is now experiencing may well be
a reflection of the depth of capital consumption and impoverishment that the
U.S. economy has suffered as a result of the inflation-targeting policy of the
141
past two decades.

B.

Bailouts and Monetary Stimulus

As discussed above, under the Austrian framework, in order to foster
recovery once an economic recession hits, the best thing a central bank can do
is “absolutely nothing.”142 Also as discussed above, even without a full audit,
one can see this was not the Federal Reserve’s response to the financial crash
in 2008. In summary, Bloomberg found that the Fed committed $7.77 trillion
as of March 2009 to rescuing the financial system, including $13 billion in
undisclosed profits to banks.143 The six biggest U.S. banks—JPMorgan, Bank
of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley—
borrowed as much as $460 billion from the Fed and accounted for sixty-three
percent of the average daily debt to the Fed by all publicly traded “U.S. banks,
money managers and investment-services firms.”144 Furthermore, a GAO audit
under the Dodd-Frank Act detailed how the Fed provided $16 trillion in secret
loans to bailout American and foreign banks during the financial crisis.145 As
discussed above, these types of bailouts by the Federal Reserve in the wake of
the 2008 crisis created a classic moral hazard problem: these bailouts made it
more likely that financial institutions “engage in more or less reckless financial
planning, expecting that the monetary authorities will not allow a great mass of
reckless planners to go bankrupt.”146 Furthermore, under the Austrian
framework, these types of bailouts tend to “prop up” the malinvested business
structure and impede real recovery.147

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Salerno, supra note 116, at 36.
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Id.
Rothbard, supra note 54, at 87.
Ivry, Keoun, & Kuntz, supra note 34.
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GAO-11-696, supra note 45, at 131.
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Fed action in response to the crisis did not stop with immediate bailouts.
On December 12, 2012, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors announced
that the Fed, in addition to continuing to purchase “additional agency
mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month,” would be
purchasing longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $45 billion per
month.148 The Federal Reserve has engaged in this type of “quantitative
easing” policy throughout the Great Recession “[t]o support a stronger
economic recovery” by “maintain[ing] downward pressure on longer-term
interest rates, support[ing] mortgage markets, and help[ing] to make broader
financial conditions more accommodative.”149 Beyond impeding real recovery,
there is evidence that Fed action is actually re-inflating into another boom:
according to estimates by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, new home sales in November 2012
increased 15.3% from November 2011.150 And, of course, with any Fed money
creation comes concern about future price inflation.151
With the foregoing in mind, the next step of analysis investigates possible
strategies to bring about Fed accountability and transparency. One such
strategy could be achieved by employing political advocacy groups, such as
Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party, whose ideologies are conducive to
addressing the issue of Fed transparency.
V. POLITICAL MOVEMENTS
A.

Occupy Wall Street

The Occupy Wall Street movement, inspired by the Arab Spring and
uprisings in Europe, began in September 2011.152 The movement was sparked
by a call from Adbusters magazine for activists to “bring a tent” to and show
up at Wall Street.153 On September 17, 2011, a few thousand activists gathered
in New York City’s financial district, with some setting up camp in Zuccotti
Park.154 The Occupy protesters took issue with “Wall Street banks, big

148. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Dec. 12, 2012), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm.
149. Id.
150. Joint Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau News & U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev.,
New Residential Sales in November 2012 (Dec. 27, 2012, 10:00 AM), available at http://content.
govdelivery.com/attachments/USESAEI/2012/12/27/file_attachments/182339/New%2BResiden
tial%2BSales%2B%2528November%2B2012%2529.pdf.
151. ROTHBARD, supra note 60, at 991.
152. Sarah van Gelder, Introduction: How Occupy Wall Street Changes Everything, in THIS
CHANGES EVERYTHING: OCCUPY WALL STREET AND THE 99% MOVEMENT 1, 1 (Sarah van
Gelder ed., 2011).
153. Id.
154. Id.
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corporations, and others among the 1%” who were “claiming the world’s
wealth for themselves at the expense of the 99% and having their way with our
governments.”155 The movement quickly spread beyond New York as
protestors gathered in hundreds of cities around the United States and, within
weeks, over 1500 cities worldwide.156
While the Occupy movement is not currently aimed at protesting Fed
policies, many of the concerns of the Occupy protestors have roots in the
Federal Reserve System. For example, economist and Occupy-champion Paul
Krugman (although a notorious advocate for expansionary monetary policy by
the Fed157) suggests that income inequality lies at the heart of America’s
economic woes.158 Likewise, Professor Raghuram Rajan criticizes the policy
response to income inequality:
While many oppose an expansion in government welfare transfers, there are
few to stand against an expansion of credit to the lower middle class—not the
politicians, who want more growth and happy constituents; not the banks,
which benefit from expanded lending; not the borrowers, who can now buy the
house they had only dreamed of; and not the laissez-faire bank regulators, who
are reluctant to oppose credit booms because they mistakenly think they can
159
pick up the pieces easily if the boom collapses.

Rajan writes that credit expansion is a way to expand middle-class
consumption, causing the masses to “pay less attention to their stagnant
monthly paychecks.”160 Thus, the policy response to rising inequality in the
United States in the 1990s and 2000s was to encourage lending to low-income
households.161 The political benefits of higher consumption were immediate.162
However, as discussed above, the unsustainable housing boom ended in
unskilled workers not only losing their jobs, but also in debt from having
borrowed to buy unaffordable houses.163 Indeed, McLean argues that the

155. Id.
156. Id. at 2.
157. Indeed, in 2002, Krugman actually called on the Fed to create a housing bubble. See Paul
Krugman, Dubya’s Double Dip?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/
02/opinion/dubya-s-double-dip.html (“To fight this recession the Fed needs more than a
snapback; it needs soaring household spending to offset moribund business investment. And to do
that . . . Alan Greenspan needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble.”).
158. Paul Krugman & Robin Wells, The Widening Gyre: Inequality, Polarization, and the
Crisis, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK 7, 9 (Janet Byrne ed., 2012).
159. Raghuram Rajan, Inequality and Intemperate Policy, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra
note 158, at 79, 81.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 82.
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financial crisis was not a referendum on home ownership, but rather a
referendum on “the growing income inequality in America”:164
[T]he great machinery of the subprime lending market was not built to enable
people to buy homes. Instead, its main purpose was to allow people to borrow
against the equity in their homes—the driver of the majority of the risky loans
that would have brought down the financial sector without a government
165
bailout.

Rajan suggests that “let them eat credit” is an appropriate way to summarize
this policy leading up the financial crises.166
Another issue near and dear to the hearts of the Occupiers is transparency.
Gillian Tett of the Financial Times167 discusses two key problems with the
financial system: the “silo problem”—banks reluctant to tell anybody details
about their activities168—and the issue of “social silences”—finance being too
“boring,” “unfamiliar,” and “technical” for mainstream public discourse.169
Tett argues that neither of these problems has been eradicated post-crisis.170
Thus far, “silo-busting” activity has been “far too modest and sporadic.”171
Another major goal for the Occupy movement is a more democratic and
egalitarian economy, or “to roll back the increasing threats to the inclusive
nature of economic institutions in the United States.”172 Following in the
footsteps of the Populists and Progressives of American history, Occupy
protestors attempt to change political institutions “to remove the control that
the wealthy have over the agendas and policies of the main political parties.”173
By definition, the Occupy movement carries general anti-Wall Street
sentiments.174

164. Bethany McLean, Your House as an ATM: The Myth of Homeownership, in THE
OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 158, at 85, 99.
165. Id. at 85–86.
166. Raghuram Rajan, Inequality and Intemperate Policy, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra
note 158, at 79, 81.
167. Gillian Tett, Hidden in Plain Sight: The Problem of Silos and Silences in Finance, in
THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 158, at 44.
168. Id. at 46–47.
169. Id. at 48–49.
170. Id. at 50–51.
171. Id. at 52.
172. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Against Political Capture: Occupiers,
Muckrakers, Progressives, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 158, at 110.
173. Id.
174. See John Cassidy, What Good Is Wall Street?, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note
158, at 54, 77 (arguing that Wall street bankers do not create enough economic value to justify the
rewards they reap); Arjun Appadurai, A Nation of Business Junkies, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK,
supra note 158, at 113, 116 (“The avalanche of business knowledge and information dropping on
the American middle class . . . has made us business junkies, ready to be lead like sheep to our
own slaughter by Wall Street, the big banks, and corrupt politicians.”).
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A movement with the foregoing concerns—namely, opposition to an
economy that “redistributes wealth from the poor and middle class to those at
the top” through, among other things, “bailouts for giant banks and
corporations”175—should have great interest in the operations of the Federal
Reserve. As discussed above, inflation has a redistributionary effect in favor of
the inflators and early receivers of the new money.176 In practice, Bloomberg
has found that the Fed committed $7.77 trillion as of March 2009 to rescuing
the financial system—with the six biggest U.S. banks borrowing as much as
$460 billion.177—while the GAO uncovered $16 trillion in secret loans to
bailout American and foreign banks during the financial crisis.178 This type of
money creation represents not only a regressive “inflation tax” on the “99%,”
but also the political power that the “1%” has in the political system. As
discussed above, Fed credit expansion policy during the boom was ultimately
to the detriment of the middle- and lower-class. Certainly, any movement that
is anti-Wall Street should at least be curious about the Fed. What better way to
foster transparency in the financial system and “stick it” to the 1% than to audit
the Fed?
Thus, Occupy Wall Street should be part of a coalition that pushes for an
audit of the Federal Reserve. Furthermore, after more light is shed on Fed
operations, the movement should be part of a coalition that provides a political
check on credit expansion, thus helping to regulate the boom-bust cycles in the
U.S. economy.
B.

The Tea Party

In 2009, the Tea Party movement emerged as a “mad as hell” opposition
movement in response to a push by President Obama and the Democrats for
economic and healthcare reform.179 The movement emerged during a time
when the Bush administration had spent hundreds of billions of dollars bailing
out Wall Street with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the
Obama administration had passed an $800 billion economic “stimulus”
package.180
The Tea Party complains of “federal government spending, the
government’s soaring debt, and the increasing size of government”:181
It complains of high taxes and excessive government spending, and it has
taken the name the Tea Party, where “Tea” stands for “Taxed Enough

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Van Gelder, supra note 152, at 3.
ROTHBARD, supra note 60, at 992.
Ivry, Keoun, & Kuntz, supra note 34.
GAO-11-696, supra note 45, at 131.
RONALD P. FORMISANO, THE TEA PARTY: A BRIEF HISTORY 5 (2012).
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 11.
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Already.” It calls for—no, demands—limited government, debt reduction, no
higher taxes, and no new spending. It reveres the Constitution, interpreting it
as limiting the powers of the federal government, and argues that Congress has
182
far exceeded its rightful boundaries.

The Tea Party has had an impact on both the Democratic and Republican
parties, particularly in the 2010 midterm elections, helping create a Republican
majority in the House of Representatives and exerting influence on the 2011
Republican legislative agenda.183
The Tea Party movement is composed of various ideological factions,
including conservatives, the “Religious Right,” and constitutionalists,184 as
well as big business and libertarians.185 It follows, then, that the movement is
wrought with internal ideological clashes.186 However, Professor Elizabeth
Price Foley identifies three core principles shared by various Tea Party factions
across the country:
(1) limited government—protecting and defending the idea that the federal
government possesses only those powers enumerated in the Constitution; (2)
unapologetic U.S. sovereignty—protecting and defending America’s borders
and independent position in the world; and (3) constitutional originalism—
interpreting the Constitution in a manner consistent with the meaning ascribed
187
by those who wrote and ratified the text.

These core principles manifest themselves in current issues that are important
to the Tea Party, including healthcare reform, fiscal responsibility,
immigration, internationalism, and the war on terror.188
At least one of the core concerns that helped spark the Tea Party
movement is directly related to this “audit the Fed” analysis: “The federal
government’s shift into bailout mode . . . reflecting the resurgence of
Keynesian economic philosophy in which a failing economy can best be
salvaged by a constant infusion of government cash—a counterintuitive, let’s
spend-our-way-out-of-this-mess mentality.”189As the Fed bails out Wall
Street190 and continues its quantitative easing programs,191 the movement’s
anti-bailout, anti-Keynesian mentality fits squarely with legislation to audit the
Fed, as well as providing a political check on the Fed’s credit expansion
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Id. at 52, 63.
ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY, THE TEA PARTY: THREE PRINCIPLES 19 (2012).
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policy. Moreover, anti-inflationism has a place in conservative ideology,192
while libertarian philosophy outright opposes the existence of the governmentchartered central bank.193 Finally, and most directly in line with Tea Party
principles, the fact that the federal government can borrow from the central
bank in order to fund its operations194 has direct and obvious implications for
the Tea Party’s main goal of curtailing “federal government spending, the
government’s soaring debt, and the increasing size of government.”195
Thus, the Tea Party should be part of a coalition that pushes for an audit of
the Federal Reserve. Furthermore, after more light is shed on Fed operations,
the movement should be part of a coalition that provides a political check on
credit expansion, thus helping to regulate the boom-bust cycles in the U.S.
economy. Indeed, we have seen that “pressure from anti-tax Tea Party activists
and other small government advocates” caused 2012 presidential candidate
Mitt Romney to at least give lip service to the idea196 and the Republican Party
to include the measure in its platform.197
CONCLUSION
The 2008 financial crisis and subsequent “Great Recession” provides a
textbook example of Austrian Business Cycle Theory, with an inflationary
boom leading to an inevitable bust.198 Furthermore, financial institutions are
more likely to engage in riskier behavior as a result of Fed bailouts that create
moral hazard.199 Despite the role the Fed plays in bringing about and
prolonging economic downturns, under current law, monetary policy decisions,
agreements with foreign central banks and governments, and Federal Open
Market Committee transactions are immune from Federal Reserve audits.200
However, the Occupy Wall Street and Tea Party movements provide an
ideological coalition that can push for an audit of the Federal Reserve.
Furthermore, after more light is shed on Fed operations, the movements should
be part of a coalition that provides a political check on credit expansion, thus
helping to regulate the boom-bust cycles in the U.S. economy. That is not to
say that either group is likely to embrace—or even understand—Austrian
Business Cycle Theory. However, the movements’ concerns for other issues,
from inequality to “big government,” can have the unintended consequence of
192.
193.
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195.
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bringing about financial reform through an “unholy coalition” of unwitting
Misesians.
There is precedent for this type of “unholy coalition”: the 2009 version of
the “audit the Fed” bill was introduced by libertarian Ron Paul in the House201
and self-described socialist Bernie Sanders in the Senate.202 Still, one might
object that a full audit and corresponding political check on Fed credit
expansion are not likely. Indeed, Mises himself wrote: “In the opinion of the
public, more inflation and more credit expansion are the only remedy against
the evils which inflation and credit expansion have brought about.”203
However, the fact remains that, according to Rasmussen, roughly seventy-five
percent of Americans favor auditing the Federal Reserve.204 As the ideological
tide of the electorate—as represented by the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street
movements—moves towards a Fed audit, so too does Congress: “audit the
Fed” finally passed the House in 2012 after Ron Paul had been introducing the
bill in Congress for a decade.205 Dr. Paul provides anecdotal evidence of the
excitement surrounding the push for Fed reform on college campuses:
I was able to speak to more than 4,000 students. . . . [W]hen I mentioned
monetary policy, the kids started cheering. Then a small group chanted, “End
the Fed! End the Fed!” The whole crowd took up the call. Many held up
burning dollar bills, as if to say to the central bank, you have done enough
damage to the American people, our future, and to the world: your time is
206
up.

If an audit of the Federal Reserve can appeal to the ideological tendencies of
both the left-wing Occupiers and the right-wing Tea Partiers, perhaps this
modest reform is a more practical alternative than trying to address Judge
Posner’s prognosis of a failure of an entire economic system.
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